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The term 'implicit bias' has very swiftly been incorporated into philosophical discourse. Our aim in this paper is to scrutinise the phenomena that fall under the rubric of implicit bias. The term is often used in a rather broad sense, to capture a range of implicit social cognitions, and this is useful for some purposes. However, we here articulate some of the important differences between phenomena identified as instances of implicit bias. We caution against ignoring these differences: it is likely they have considerable significance, not least for the sorts of normative recommendations being made concerning how to mitigate the bad effects of implicit bias. 


1. The disparate phenomena called 'implicit bias'

Philosophical attention has galvanised around the notion of implicit bias in recent years. Roughly, studies show that individuals harbour many implicit associations between mental constructs, such as 'salt' and 'pepper', or 'white' and 'good'. Sometimes associations concerning stigmatised social groups influence a decision or action. An implicitly biased decision or action is one that expresses or embodies implicit features of cognition, which distort or influence that behaviour. For example, the implicit association between the race category 'white' and evaluative term 'good' can influence people to judge more positively a CV with a white-sounding name on it than the same CV with a black-sounding name (Dovidio & Gaertner 2000). Philosophers have been particularly concerned with those implicit processes that influence behaviour in undesirable and often discriminatory ways. Some of the questions that philosophers have been interested in are: what are the ethical implications of acknowledging the influence of implicit bias on decision and action? What are the consequences for our understanding of agency, responsibility, and how we ought to act? What is epistemologically problematic about the operation of implicit bias? What kinds of material changes in the world are needed to address and mitigate the likely operation of implicit bias? (See e.g. Kelly & Roedder 2008, Machery, Faucher, Kelly 2010, Holroyd 2012, Gendler 2011, Haslanger 2008)

What, exactly, is implicit bias? Understanding this is an important step in sensibly addressing these other questions. Our concern is that broad characterisations of implicit bias have led to misleading generalisations, and normative recommendations that  may either be counter-productive, or at least less useful than they could be – so we will argue.

Let us start by observing some of the ways in which the term has been characterised and used. In her influential paper 'Implicit bias, Stereotype threat and Women in Philosophy', Jennifer Saul characterises implicit bias as:
'unconscious biases that affect the way we perceive, evaluate, or interact with people from the groups that our biases “target”' (1).
This is a useful functional definition: implicit biases are whatever unconscious processes influence our perceptions, judgements and actions - in this context, in relation to social category members (women, blacks, gays, for example).​[1]​ However,  there is some evidence that suggests that implicit biases are not always ‘unconscious’. It is contentious that the participants are unaware of the cognition that is being implicitly measured in tasks such as the IAT (De Houwer, 2006, Monteith & Voils 1998).  Work on the correction of implicit race bias specifically suggests that some awareness of implicit bias is possible, if not likely (Wegener & Petty, 1995). (It would not be surprising, given the argument to follow, if there were variations in awareness of different implicit associations.) The debate about awareness of implicit processes is interesting, but is not our focus here (for a discussion, see De Houwer, 2006; Fazio & Olson, 2003; see also, Gawronski, Hofmann, & Wilbur, 2006). Nonetheless, implicit biases do seem to share many properties of automatic processes: these processes operate quickly and with efficiency and cannot be easily controlled (Andersen, Moskowitz, Blair, Nosek, 2007). 
More importantly for the focus of this paper, the functional definition we have started with here leaves open the matter of precisely what processes constitute implicit bias, and in particular whether we are dealing with a singular entity, or a range of psychological tendencies. 
A further concern is that this usage seems to permit ambiguous use of the notion of implicit bias, however: sometimes ‘implicit bias’ is used to refer to an output such as a biased decision or judgement (for example: '[i]t seems very likely, then, that philosophers will display implicit bias against women' (Saul, 6)). It is also used in a way that appears to refer to a mental state or process. This can be seen in remarks concerning people 'hav[ing] implicit biases' (Saul, 21). We think this encourages the tendency to suppose that there is a unified process or state (implicit bias) which produces distorting influence on judgement and action (also referred to as implicit bias). ​[2]​
Elsewhere, the term ‘implicit bias’ has been used even more expansively. In addressing the epistemological implications of implicit bias, Tamar Gendler (2011) discusses the phenomena of racial categorisation, stereotype threat, and the cognitive depletion subjects experience after interracial interactions, all under the rubric of ‘implicit bias’. In this context, then, implicit bias is being used to pick out a range of social cognitions (and affective states), including but not limited to: unconscious activation and application of stereotypes (involving conscious feelings of anxiety/threat), automatic categorisation (of things or people into groups which are perceived as sharing properties), and effortful activity (such as suppression of biased responses or stereotyping). 

We contend that whilst in some contexts this kind of expansive understanding of implicit bias can be useful (section 2), it also has significant limitations and tends to obscure important differences between implicit associations (sections 3 onwards).

2. The usefulness of an expansive concept
For three reasons, this broad usage makes considerable sense: first, the processes at issue in (e.g.) Gendler's treatment of the issue are all automatic, difficult to discern from introspection, difficult to bring under reflective control, and as a result not governed by the same norms of reasoning that reflective states (such as occurrent beliefs and desires) are. It is useful to identify a set of processes that share these features, and contrast them with the kinds of reflective processes to which philosophers have typically attended. This enables attention to be drawn to the large range of mental activity not encompassed by a focus only on reflective, deliberative cognition, and the importance of recognising this range and its role in our mental lives.
Secondly, functional definitions such as Saul's are helpful if one is concerned - as is important - with articulating the widespread effects of implicit biases, and the worries that arise in relation to these. For example, if we want to focus on and articulate the patterns of discrimination that implicit biases might be implicated in, then attending closely to the nature of the implicit cognitions themselves is not the priority task. If the priority is articulating those effects, rather than looking at the processes that produce those effects and ways of combating them, then it is reasonable to talk of implicit bias as simply whatever implicit processes produced those effects. Such a priority is important in gaining recognition of the pervasive nature of the problem (one can't encourage people to adopt strategies to combat the problem if they don't agree there is a problem).​[3]​
Another consequential reason for subsuming a number of phenomena under the notion of implicit bias is that it makes it more likely that certain important claims about implicit bias are true. For example, Saul makes the general claim that 'human beings are strongly influenced by a range of disturbing and often unconscious biases' (1). And indeed, this claim is likely to be true if the notion of implicit bias is broadly construed to include a range of implicit social cognitions. The claim that 'we are all likely to be implicitly biased' (Saul, 21) will be true, if 'implicitly biased' refers to a range of phenomena extending to a number of different negative and socially consequential implicit social cognitions.​[4]​ 
We do not mean to suggest that there is any sleight of hand here: gaining traction in addressing the effects of implicit bias requires garnering agreement on the claim that almost all of us will need to reconsider the ways in which our judgements and actions may be influenced - ways we would find surprising and perhaps uncomfortable. For these purposes, a broad characterisation of implicit bias is legitimate and useful. 
However, we think that there are two dangers in the philosophical discourse about implicit bias (which amplify each other). Firstly, we want to suggest that there are some dangers in regarding ‘implicit bias’ as a catch-all for a range of implicit (and not so implicit) social cognitions; doing so permits generalisations that may not be warranted. Secondly, we want to raise concerns about the tendency to overlook the ways in which processes that fall under the rubric of implicit bias may differ. Attending to these differences has important implications for the normative recommendations made about how to combat problematic implicit biases.
This tendency is reinforced by the philosophical discourse concerning implicit bias, which speaks to 'the effects of implicit bias', 'the ethical implications of implicit bias', 'the epistemological implications of implicit bias' and so on (for examples of such usage, see Gendler 2011, Saul 2013, Machery et al 2010, Holroyd 2012). This kind of discourse implies that the concern is with a certain process (implicit bias) and its effects, and plays down the idea that there might be differences between different processes falling under the rubric of implicit bias.




3. Implicit processes and different kinds of implicit associations

Philosophers are not alone in making assumptions about the unified nature of the phenomena. Amodio (2008) observes that 'researchers [including empirical psychologists] have generally assumed that implicit stereotyping and evaluation arise from the same underlying mechanism' (7). In the following sections, we articulate the reasons to suppose that implicit bias is heterogeneous, and that this heterogeneity matters considerably.

In the literature from empirical psychology, we find reference to 'implicit processes' rather than implicit biases (Amodio 2010, Nosek, Hawkins, Frazier, 2012; for a review, see Gawronski & Payne, 2010). This makes clear that what is at issue is a set of processes, which share the property of being 'implicit' - generally (and not uncontestedly​[5]​)under the radar of reflective introspection , difficult to bring under reflective control, quick and efficient. 

Amodio (in accordance with most other psychologists working in this domain - e.g., Fazio, 2007; Greenwald, Banaji, Rudman, Farnham, Nosek, & Mellott, 2002) understands these implicit processes essentially to consist in the utilisation of 'associations stored in memory' (2010, 364). To put it in our terms, one can consider these processes to consist of relating cognitive (including affective) content, that is mental representations or associations, to behavioural dispositions, in a particular context..

Associations​[6]​ are discerned by tests such as the implicit association test (IAT) and affective priming task (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, and Williams, 1995).  In the IAT (the most popular implicit measure) the implicit associations present in an individual's cognitive structures are revealed in the swiftness of response in categorising concepts into pairs. These tasks require individuals to pair up items from different categories (e.g. categories of black, white (faces or names), with words valenced as positive or negative). The speed with which pairing is done reflects the strength of an individual's implicit association. For example, if an individual is faster to pair white and good, than black and good (or white and bad), then it is inferred that she has a stronger association between white and good than black and good. This stronger association is taken to mean that the association is more accessible in memory, and this is what facilitates the faster response time (see Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998).

A range of experimental tests aim to reveal individuals' associations, and thereby identify factors that may play a role in perception, judgement and action, but which go unreported in reflective (explicit) statements of what guided behaviour (either because of self-presentation worries (Fazio & Olson, 2003) or simply because such associations are not readily detectable by the agent).

What kinds of associations are at issue here? A number of central cases of implicit bias have concerned philosophers (there are numerous studies, but these have received significant attention): the associations between social category and stereotypic or negative notions are cause for particular concern. Such associations have variously been found to guide the evaluation of CV's, produce shooter bias, and affect inter-racial interactions (see e.g. Saul 2013, Kelly & Roedder 2008, Machery et al 2010). Are the same associative mechanisms, or kinds of mechanisms, involved in each of these cases? Do the associations all function in the same way, or are there important differences? 

We advance two claims here: first, that evidence indicates that different associations have different characteristics. Accordingly there is reason to doubt that all generalisations about implicit bias can be substantiated. Secondly, drawing on the work of Amodio (2008) and Amodio & Devine (2006), we consider whether it is appropriate to understand one dimension along which implicit bias differs in terms of whether the implicit associations are semantic or affective. These terms refer to ways of categorising kinds of associative process, according to whether the association is determined by the meaning of the associated constructs, or the positive or negative affect accompanying a construct.  We argue that this distinction is problematic, and so whilst we might endorse the general claim that implicit associations differ in respect of some of their properties, we do not endorse the more specific claim that these differences are captured in terms of the semantic/affective distinction. However, if the general claim is right, there will be important consequences for making generalisations about implicit bias. In particular there are implications for the general recommendations made concerning how to mitigate implicit bias, which we address in the final section. 


3.1 Biases behaving differently
At first glance, it seems clear that the studies that have been focused upon involve different associations. Some studies test for gendered associations, others test for associations with racial categories, others still for age, sexuality, and religious or ethnic groups, and respective associations.​[7]​ Clearly, there are different associations involved in the studies reported on. The strength of implicit associations between the following categories(inter alia) have been tested:
	
	
-gender (gendered words (she, woman/he, man)) and words associated with 	leadership (manager, director/ worker, assistant) (Webb, Sheeran & Pepper 2010)
-sexuality (images of gay and heterosexual kisses) and positive and negative words 	(Payne, Cooley & Lei ms.)
	-race (black and white name primes) and personal preferences (like/dislike) 		(Olson & Fazio 2004); black and white faces and positive and negative words (Devine & Amodio 2006)
	-gendered pronouns (he/she) and job titles (nurse, mechanic) (Banaji & Hardin 		1996)
-ethnic/religious group words (Muslim/Scottish) and words associated with terror, or peace (Webb, Sheeran & Pepper 2010). 

It is obvious that there are different associations involved here - the relevant associations hold between relata with different content. But what do these differences amount to? Can these different associations be treated as a unified class of processes? Should we expect all of these associations to behave in similar ways? We claim that there is reason to suppose not, and that this has implications for philosophical discussion about, and practical recommendations relating to implicit biases. 

One reason to think not is that there is reason to suppose that the various implicit measures are accessing discreet and non-unified implicit associations (such that they do not all cluster together to form an 'implicit attitude'), or perhaps different kinds of implicit processes. The IAT is one amongst a number of implicit measures, that is, tests which attempt to 'get at' individuals' implicit associations (such as their implicit race associations). A number of authors have pointed out that individuals' scores across implicit measures weakly correlate (that is - showing an implicit association (in a high score) on one does not correlate with showing a high score on another).​[8]​

In a survey article, Nosek et al argue that one of the best explanations for this weak correlation is simply the range of processes being tested for by the various implicit measures:

the relations may also reflect heterogeneity of cognitive processes that contribute to the various measures. The term implicit has become widely applied to measurement methods for which subjects may be unaware of what is being measured, unaware of how it is being measured, or unable to control their performance on the measure. Identification of the cognitive processes that contribute to different measures will promote a more nuanced description and categorization of methods based on the particular processes that they engage (Nosek et al, 2007 p.277)

The central idea for our present purposes is that the lack of correlation between implicit measures, as Nosek claims, is likely due to the different processes or cognitive structures that each measure is tapping in to. That they are heterogeneous is a good explanation of the lack of correlation between the measures. Nosek et al suggest that 

The next generation of research in implicit cognition will likely revise the simple
implicit–explicit distinction and introduce a more refined taxonomy that better
reflects the heterogeneity of cognitive processes that are collectively termed
implicit (ibid, 267). 

Our contention is that philosophers also need to be alert to the possible distinctions between different kinds of implicit cognitive processes, for two reasons: first because evidence supporting such a taxonomy is relevant to the generalisations that can be made about implicit associations. Secondly, because the way that the distinctions are drawn may themselves require philosophical scrutiny. We return to this point shortly.

Regarding the first concern, one illustration of this pertains to the claims that philosophers have variously made about individuals being afflicted by implicit bias irrespective of their explicit beliefs. But there is reason to suppose that this generalisation cannot be made. With respect to some associations, this claim seems true: in tests for implicit associations between gendered pronouns (he/she) and stereotypical roles (nurse/secretary) Banaji & Hardin (1996) found no difference in the extent of implicit biases between individuals who, on self-report measures, scored either high or low in sexist beliefs (p.139). In contrast, in studies reported in Devine (2002), it appears that individuals who held non-prejudiced behaviour to be important in itself display less race bias on race IAT's (which require pairing black and white face or names with positive or negative words) - that is, the explicit beliefs and attitudes an individual held did seem to correlate with the degree of implicit bias they manifested. 

Crucially, the heterogeneity of implicit biases in this respect means that some generalisations about the relationship of implicit associations to explicit beliefs – such as that implicit biases are independent of explicit attitudes – cannot be substantiated.

We have in this section provided some initial evidence in support of the heterogeneity of implicit associations. In summary: implicit associations have different content; some of these different contents are revealed in different measures, which do not seem to correlate; and different implicit associations seem to stand in different relation to explicit beliefs of the agent. Of course, one explanation for these bits of evidence could be simply that the experimental designs did not always produce or measure the effects that they should or could have. Nonetheless, the findings should give reason to exercise caution about claims that are general in nature, and that make recommendations for the regulation of bias that suppose general applicability of such recommendations. And, in the next section, we provide further considerations in support of the claim that the best explanation of this heterogeneity is not experimental deficit, but rather differences between implicit associations and their operation.

3.2 Distinct associations with distinct behavioural influence 


We have identified associations that are obviously, on the face of it, different. We have noted that these biases appear to stand in different relationships to explicit beliefs. This suffices for our central message of caution regarding the generalisations that can be made about implicit biases (a message we shall elaborate in section 4). At least in this respect, then, generalisations about implicit biases are mistaken. This is significant, as there is a tendency to suppose that implicit biases are unrelated to explicit beliefs; this may have further implications for how questions such as control, responsibility and accountability are considered. 

In this section, we consider a further way in which implicit associations may differ, namely, with respect to the influence they exert on different kinds of behaviour. This dimension of heterogeneity has been articulated in the context of empirical studies that aim to differentiate 'semantic' and 'affective' associations. If we take these experimental results at face value, then there would be reason to suppose that it identifies some underlying structure to the heterogeneous implicit processes. However, we argue that there are reasons to worry about this distinction, and that it should not, as presently articulated, be endorsed. This does not, however, undermine our central claim that implicit processes differ in important ways; and it reinforces the claim that philosophers should attend to the ways in which psychologists are distinguishing different implicit biases. We explore the implications of this claim in the final section. 





Amodio & Devine (2006) attempted to isolate the operation of different associations, and test for the presence of each. In order to do this, they constructed two race IAT's. One was designed to test for associations between race and certain stereotypic  traits: white/black, and mental (e.g. brainy, smart, educated) or physical (athletic, agile, rhythmic) constructs. They supposed that individuals might hold these implicit associations (such as a stronger association between black and physical constructs and between white and mental constructs) without also having negative attitudes or affect associated with that racial category (in common and imprecise parlance, an individual might hold a stereotype without having negative attitudes or disliking the stereotyped individuals). The second IAT was designed to test for these latter, negative affect laden associations, by asking participants to pair black or white faces with pleasant or unpleasant constructs (respectively: love, loyal, freedom; abuse, bomb, sickness).

The striking - and crucial for our purposes - finding was this: 'the participant's scores on the two IAT's were uncorrelated' (Amodio & Devine, 2006, 14). That is to say, the extent to which individuals expressed the mental/physical associations was not correlated with scores on the second IAT for negative implicit attitudes.

Why is this significant? Firstly, it suggests that the two associations were in some subjects operating independently (Amodio & Devine, 2006, 655). Whilst we might expect many implicit associations to go in step (for example, we might expect an individual who implicitly associates black men with danger to also have implicit negative affect (fear) towards them) this study indicates that at least some implicit associations about the same group are held independently.

Secondly, these findings indicate that there may be variation across individuals with respect to which associations are operative in producing implicitly biased perceptions, judgements of or actions towards a particular group. For any implicit association, some individuals may have it and others may not (this is consistent with the variation in affective association found in studies by Devine et al (2002)). But the presence of (e.g.) one kind of implicit race association does not entail the presence of other forms of implicit race associations​[9]​ - and conversely, the absence of one implicit association does not entail that one is free from other problematic implicit race biases.

Even if much of the time, or in many subjects, implicit associations work in concert, if there are distinct associations then it will be important to understand further the ways in which they may differ. This is of crucial import, given the differential behavioural outputs that these two implicit associations correlated with, which we now describe. 


b. Distinct influences on behaviour

Not only did the studies indicate that different implicit associations were not correlated; they also indicated that the different associations uniquely predict different behavioural outcomes. In the Amodio & Devine (2006) study, participants were asked to make judgements about the competences of a potential test partner, and then asked to sit and wait for their test partner to enter the room. The - in fact, fictive - test partner was indicated to be African American. Seating distance was measured as a behavioural indicator of positive or negative affect. Experimental participants who displayed strong associations on the race IAT for the mental/physical constructs, described above, made judgements about the competence of their test partner consistent with stereotypes (such as competence on questions about sports and popular culture, rather than maths). But these kinds of associations did not predict greater seating distance from the test partner. On the other hand, manifestation of strong affective associations on the affect-based IAT uniquely predicted seating distance (greater negative affect associations correlated with greater seating distance), but not judgements of competence. 

So, one association seems to be implicated in the judgements and evaluations individuals made, the other in approach or avoidance behaviours. This provides further support for the worry we raise: that certain generalisations about predicted behaviours cannot be made across various implicit associations.​[10]​ Note that this is not at all surprising when we consider associations that differ in their target: we would not expect gender associations to predict behavioural outcomes regarding racial interactions. What is noteworthy here is that different race associations (that is, associations that concern the same target social identity) are operating independently, and with different behavioural predictions. ​[11]​

If different implicit associations seem to exert influence on different kinds of behaviour, then understanding this will be important in formulating strategies that aim to combat implicit bias. In relation to the particular associations at issue here, for example, if one is involved in a task such as evaluation of an individual's competence or intelligence, then mitigating the associations between race and mental or physical constructs that may influence that judgement will be of particular importance. On the other hand, if one is concerned with increasing the amount and quality of intergroup contact, one might focus on limiting or changing negative affective associations. 


c. A dimension of heterogeneity: semantic and affective associations?

The experimental results we have just presented in support of our thesis that implicit associations are heterogeneous and may not readily admit of the sorts of generalisations that have been made (concerning behavioural predictions and their relation to explicit beliefs for example). However, these results are framed in empirical psychology in terms of two different kinds of associations: semantic and affective. The mental/physical constructs are identified as 'semantic' associations. Other examples of this kind of association are: salt/pepper; woman/she. The unpleasant/pleasant constructs (used on the second IAT described above) are identified as 'affective' associations - associations that have an affective valence. Other associations put into this category include those for which one relata is evaluative, either generally ('good/bad') or in more specific ways ('attractive/disgusting'). Generalisations about these two kinds of association, concerning their influence on behaviour, how they might be learned or unlearned, are then made. We have not here adopted this way of conceptualising the distinction, nor supposed that the differences described in the previous sections are underpinned by such differences in kind, and are reluctant to do so for the following reasons. 

Firstly, it seems inappropriate to identify as 'semantic' the association between race (black/white) and mental or physical constructs. This category has been used to identify associations that hold between 'semantically related concepts' (Amodio 2008, 8). But the association is not adequately characterised as a matter of the semantic meaning of black or white; nothing in the meaning of these terms is associated with mental or physical constructs (in contrast the meaning of woman/she clearly is semantically related; a paradigm case of semantic relationship is between 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man'). The characterisation might aim to pick out the fact that certain semantic content has become associated with the racial category, such that the two are associated in mind. But this does not help us to pick out one side of the distinction, as paradigm relata of affective associations (good, attractive, etc) have semantic content which comes to be associated with one social group.

Perhaps what is at issue is the contents of a schema (or stereotype) for different racial categories (and other aspects of social identity) (Haslanger, 2008). Schemas are characterised by Haslanger as 'a patterned set of dispositions in response to one’s circumstances' (2008, p.212). Might we understand semantic associations in terms of the contents of a schema, saying that if included in a schema, an association (a kind of pattern of thought) is semantically associated? The problem is that it is not at all clear that schemas don't include the sorts of associations that have been classified as 'affective' - dispositions to respond could just as well be underpinned by affect as by cognitive understandings. (Haslanger is here drawing on Valian, who denies that schemas have affective content. Valian writes that on her account schemas are 'cold'. Her account 'is purely cognitive rather than emotional or motivational' (2005, 198). We believe our point to show that Valian's understanding of schemas, which is narrower than Haslanger's, to be mistaken in excluding affective content.) 

Moreover,  not only does the way of describing the distinction seem inapt; rather, we don't think it is clear where the distinction cuts, as various possible ways of articulating it don't seem defensible. If the distinction is supposed to be between associations with semantic content and those without, then this cannot be right, because some that are supposed to be on the affective side have semantic content (good, disgusting, etc).

Perhaps the distinction is supposed to be between associations that are affectively valenced (with positive or negative affective 'pull') and those that are not. Some who endorse the primacy of affect thesis, according to which all concepts held have some valence, might worry about this characterisation: everything, it seems, would fall into the 'affective' category. One might reject that worry: perhaps the 'affective' associations can be identified as those that produce affect above a certain threshold. Even still, that the categories do not seem to be exclusive seems to pose difficulties for the thesis that there are two distinct kinds of association about which generalisations and predictions can be made (especially because the experimental studies utilise notions which incorporate both semantic content and affect (good/bad; attractive/disgusting, etc). Even those terms used in the Amodio & Devine studies (intelligence, athleticism) have both evaluative and semantic content (both characteristics are positive, good, features). 

If the distinction cannot satisfactorily be established, then it cannot be part of a useful explanation of the differences that have been experimentally recorded. An analogy can help us to make this point. Suppose one wanted to evaluate children's well-being, and one supposed that one dimension that might explain different levels of well-being is whether the child has an active father in their lives, or is raised by a single parent. One might construct a study to evaluate this hypothesis. But that distinction on which the hypothesis rests is problematic, and cannot be explanatorily useful in predicting different outcomes, because (obviously) some single parents are fathers. If there are different outcomes in children's well-being, some other way of understanding and describing the circumstances that might make that difference must be sought. By the same token, the distinction between semantic and affective distinctions cannot be explanatorily useful in explaining different outcomes (e.g. different behavioural influences) if some so-called semantic associations are also strongly affect-laden. A different way of understanding and describing the processes which might make a difference to outcomes must be sought.

Given these concerns, we do not here endorse the idea that what distinguishes different implicit associations (and any different underlying mechanisms) is that some are semantic and others affective. This is consequential for the notions that are at work in empirical psychology: we suggest that this distinction is unsatisfactory and needs clarification. However, for the purposes of our main thesis here, this concern is unproblematic: we need not establish that there is a clear cut distinction between different implicit processes (and how to draw it) to appreciate the variation in the degree of affect, and the way this might lead to differences in influence, controllability, and behavioural predictions in relation to different associations. 

That the distinctions at work in empirical psychology are problematic poses difficulties for philosophers wanting to draw clear conclusions about the nature of implicit biases: the claims are made on the basis of experimental findings that use problematic hypotheses.  However, for present purposes, there is no reason to believe that different hypotheses would yield the finding that there are no differences in how implicit associations operate (in terms of their behavioural predictions or relationship to each other).

Ultimately, it seems to us that at present, experimental evidence supports the claim that implicit associations differ in some respects, such that some generalisations about implicit bias are unsupported. But it does not seem warranted to identify the respects in which they differ to be with regard to their being semantic or affective; nor are some of the generalisations across  different kinds of associations defensible.  So we do not endorse this distinction, although we accept that the experimental study does support the claim that implicit associations differ in some respects, and that this warrants caution in the kinds of general claims made about implicit associations.





We started by showing that experimental results suggest that it will be difficult to make certain generalisations about the processes that fall under the rubric of ‘implicit bias’. Whilst we have suggested that there are problems with framing the experimental results on which we draw in terms of semantic and affective associations, as Amodio and Devine  do, we remain confident that the experimental findings support our main thesis, namely, that implicit associations are heterogeneous in nature. 

This is supported by the following considerations: the differences in content, and the failure of correlation across implicit measures; the different relationship of implicit associations to explicit beliefs; the different behavioural predictions generated by different implicit associations. We have suggested that further work is to be done in making precise the nature of this heterogeneity.  


We have already alluded to the fact that these findings will have implications for philosophical discourse about implicit bias. In the next section, we explain in more detail what we take these implications to be, and make specific recommendations about how philosophical discussions about implicit bias can accommodate these concerns.


4. Implications of the heterogeneity of implicit bias
In this section, we draw out three key implications of recognising the heterogeneity of implicit bias. 

4.1 Avoiding misleading generalisations
The first implication of the aforementioned discussion pertains to the kinds of theoretical claims that have been made about implicit bias. Philosophers have reported on implicit bias in rather general terms, for example: 

implicit biases influence many forms of behavior and judgment. For instance, one study showed subjects harboring implicit biases against Blacks were more likely to interpret ambiguous actions made by a Black person negatively than neutrally (Rudman & Killanski 2002) .... while another documented subtle influences on the way subjects interacted with Black experimenters (McConnel & Leibold 2001)... Recent work has even shown that implicit biases can influence which prescriptions doctors are likely to issue to Black versus White patients (Green et al 2007) 
(Machery, E., Faucher, L., & Kelly, D. 2010 p.4)

Whilst not untrue, these claims encourage the view that we need not attend to differences between implicit associations. However, in each case, the implicit associations at work were different. In the first instance, at issue were implicit associations between typically black and typically white names, and negative stereotypical attributes (hostile, violent, criminal, dangerous) versus positive attributes (calm, lawful, ethical, polite). The study found correlation between implicit associations between black names and stereotypic traits, and attributions of hostility when presented with ambiguous actions of a black male target (Rudman & Lee, 2002, 136). ​[12]​  In the second, the associations tested for were typically black and typically white names, and desirable ('wonderful', 'awesome') or undesirable words ('offensive', 'disgusting') (McConnell & Leibold, 2001,436). The third study used an IAT that asked for categorisation of black and white faces, and 'good' and 'bad' categories (Green et al 2007, 1232). These specific implicit associations were correlated with differential healthcare recommendations. 

It may be that individuals who hold one of these implicit associations also hold others – but the authors have not established this, and there is some evidence to suggest that there is variation across individuals, both with respect to the particular stereotypes they hold, and with respect to the affective attitudes they hold towards individuals (whom they may or may not implicitly stereotype) (Fazio 1995, Devine et al 2002, Amodio & Devine 2006).

One reason for which the impression of generality is problematic is simply that of accuracy. But we outline in the next section reasons for thinking that it is problematic in a further way. Gaining an accurate understanding of the problems, and being in a position to make specific and useful normative recommendations, is hindered by the use of the term implicit bias in this broad way which does not specify what kind of associations are at issue. (As noted at the start, there may be some other purposes that are well served by using the term in a broad sense.)


4.2 Useful and specific normative recommendations
There are implications for the kinds of normative recommendations philosophers make about strategies for combating implicit bias. Such strategies generally fall into two categories (see Jolls & Sunstein 2006): insulating strategies aim to put in place mechanisms which prevent bias from being activated by insulating individuals from the information that might activate them. For example, anonymising CVs or essays means that evaluators do not have the information (about the gender, age or race of the evaluated individual) that might trigger implicit associations that distort judgement or influence behaviour. This sort of strategy, therefore, need not be sensitive to the heterogeneity of implicit bias, insofar as it simply prevents bias relevant information from reaching the individual. 

Mitigating strategies are ones that attempt to limit any effects of implicit bias where activation and influence remains a possibility (because insulation from bias relevant information is not possible). Mitigation might occur either by hindering the activation of the bias, or if it is activated, by blocking its influence upon judgement or action. For example, in interview contexts, where at least some salient social identities of an individual are not possible to 'cover up' or 'anonymise', steps need to be taken to reduce the likelihood of any implicit associations being activated, or if activated, from having an effect on judgement or action. Such steps might involve the deliberate exposure to counterstereotypical exemplars (so as to inhibit the activation of stereotypical associations) (Joy-Gaba & Nosek 2010), or having agreed upon the weightings of criteria for evaluation  (so that the influence of bias (which can lead merit to be redefined to accommodate bias) might be  corrected) (Uhlmann & Cohen 2005). 

We argue that recommendations about the kind of mitigating strategies that should be undertaken need to be sensitive to the likely implicit associations at work, and the kind of behavioural outcome at issue. For example, the limited experimental findings outlined above suggest that some implicit associations will influence judgement rather than approach/avoidance behaviours, and others will have greater influence on such behaviours (less so on evaluative judgements). If this is right, then it is possible that a mitigating strategy might misfire by targeting an implicit association that is less likely to be influential in that particular context. For example, in light of the findings described above, we can say that if one is aiming to mitigate the influence of implicit associations on interracial interactions (which may involve approach/avoidance behaviours, such as seating distance) it would be a mistake to focus mitigating strategies on the implicit associations between mental/physical constructs and race. The strength of those associations did not correlate with greater seating distance (avoidance behaviour). Conversely, strategies which require individuals to reflect on positive exemplars to overcome implicit race biases might target negative affect, but it is not clear that they will be effective in mitigating the influence of implicit associations that feed into evaluations of competence or academic aptitude. Indeed, there is reason to suppose that they will not be effective, given that positive exemplars might encode associations that affirms some other associations (for example, Michael Jordan as a positive exemplar might entrench the stereotypical associations concerning race and mental or physical constructs)

Given the need for more information about the ways in which different implicit associations might operate differently, we are hesitant to make concrete proposals about how best to mitigate biases: more research is needed on what strategies are relevant to different implicit associations. However, our key claim is that it is important to be alert to the possibility that different associations are in play, and that adopting one strategy for mitigating implicit bias (e.g. exposure to counter-stereotypical exemplars) is likely to be at best partial, and may address only part of the possible associations that could lead to implicitly biased outcomes. An awareness of how different strategies are effective in combating different implicit associations should counsel in favour of more comprehensive strategies for mitigating implicit biases.





Research programmes into the way in which the different kinds of association differ and interact are ongoing. On the basis of the argumentation above, we make the recommendation to empirical psychologists that the distinction between affective and semantic associations be revisited and reconsidered. Moreover, we close by offering three further recommendations for philosophers continuing to work on the range of important issues raised by the empirical findings about implicit bias. 

First, we recommend caution with respect to generalisations that are made about implicit bias. Whilst some generalisations are true and useful, we have drawn on evidence that indicates that other such generalisations are at best misleading. 

Second, with respect to the formulation and implementation of normative claims concerning how to mitigate the effects of implicit biases we recommend approaches  that acknowledge the differences between implicit biases, and different strategies that might be needed to combat each of them. Attention to the different  association that might be involved in a given context, and the specific strategies that might be needed to combat the different kinds of implicit association, is needed. (We might aver that employing as many strategies as possible is the best plan, but, whilst a reasonable inference, this is as yet empirically unsupported).
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^1	 	Saul's focus is principally on harmful implicit biases, but she notes that there are a range of idiosyncratic and unproblematic biases.
^2	 	Perhaps this conflation of output and cognitive content reflects the confusion over awareness mentioned above. While there is no evidence that people lack conscious awareness of the cognitive content measured by implicit measures, there is evidence to suggest that, under certain conditions, this content may impact other processes and behaviours outside of conscious awareness (Gawronski, et al., 2006). As such, the question of whether implicit bias is unconscious depends on whether one is referring to content or output. More precisely, the evidence seems to suggest that it is the effect of content on output that may, under some circumstance, be outside of conscious awareness. One of the key points we make in this paper is that distinguishing differing content is important in understanding implicit processes – the way content (i.e., mental representations/associations) impact on behaviour (output).   
^3	 	NB: page references to Saul's 2013 are to the pagination in manuscript, pending publication of volume.
^4	 	That is: for an particular bias, b, it may not be probable that an individual has that bias - but for a range of biases, b1-bn, it is probable that an individual has a bias in that range. So it remains true that all individuals are likely to have some biases.
^5	 	See e.g. Monteith et al 2001,  see De Houwer, 2006; Fazio & Olson, 2003; Nosek et al., 2012
^6	 	The idea that memory is associative is a long held view that originates in Aristotle and was developed in 17th century philosophy (e.g., Locke). Subsequently, psychologists and neuroscientists concerned with learning and memory have adapted this idea. However, there is work to suggest that this associative picture of mind may be fundamentally flawed (see Gallistel, 2008; Gallistel & King, 2009; Gallistel & Matzel, 2013). While discussion of this point is outside the scope of the present chapter, we feel it important to acknowledge and to make clear that our argument is not fundamentally based on an associative picture of memory. Regardless of the way memory is organised and instantiated in the brain, we believe that it is a mistake to suppose that the cognitive processes at work in implicit biases are all relevantly similar. 
^7	 	Other implicit associations that have little directly to do with social identity have also been studied, such as associations concerned with health and other foods, with objects of fear (such as snakes) and so on. Whilst these associations have garnered less interest from philosophers, they have been important in advancing understanding of the kind of cognitive architecture at work in these implicit attitudes and in developing clinical interventions for addiction and various psychopathologies. 
^8	 	 For similar claims about the lack of correlations between the different measures for implicit attitudes related specifically to self-esteem, see Bosson, Swann & Pennebaker 2000.
^9	 	As Alex Madva has pointed out (correspondence) it might permit us to infer the increased probability of other sorts of implicit race association, even if the correlation is low. 
^10	 	 They also suggest that the confounding of these two kinds of associations and their related behavioural effects may go some way to addressing the allegedly weak predictive power of implicit associations on behaviour: perhaps the wrong behavioural outcome, given the association tested for, is being studied: ‘many null effects reported in the literature may have resulted from a mismatch between forms of implicit bias with outcome measures of discrimination’ (659).
^11	 	 Thanks to Alex Madva for emphasising the importance of this point.
^12	 	Machery et al in fact reference Rudman & Killanski 2002, but that article is concerned with gender and authority attributes, so we assume they are concerned with this article which discusses the studies concerning the interpretation of ambiguous actions after race primes, and the correlation of attributions of hostility with IAT scores that show implicit associations between black names and the negative attributes described. 
